A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument1
1
I would like to thank John Fischer, Ish Haji, Al Mele, Stephen Schwartz, and an anonymous referee for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for helpful comments on this paper. I am especially indebted to Derk Pereboom for his extensive and thoughtful suggestions on earlier drafts.
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