When global norms meet local politics: Localising transparency in extractive industries governance

Processes of norm localisation play a crucial role in shaping the extent to which global governance norms are institutionalised at national and sub-national levels. This article explores the politics of norm localisation through an empirical investigation of how global norms of “ transparency ” were localised in sub-national processes of extractive industry governance in Bojonegoro, Indonesia. Previous theories of localisation have emphasised “ constructivist ” dynamics through which patterns of norm localisation are shaped decisively by efforts to build normative or cognitive congruence with local ideas and identities. In contrast, the mix of a newly democratised environment, the persistent power of corporatist elite networks and a populist style of local politics prevailing in Bojonegoro have diminished the significance of such constructivist dynamics as a basis for explaining varied patterns of norm localisation. Instead, patterns of norm localisation have depended crucially on the capacity of local political leaders to harness global governance norms instrumentally as a basis for consolidating and strengthening their own local power base. These findings have important implications for both theoretical and practical understandings of how global norm localisation processes vary in response to the contrasting political contexts in which global governance norms targeting the extractive sector are implemented.


| INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, transparency has been widely promoted as a global governance norm, comprising a key ingredient of broader international agendas of "good governance" and corruption eradication directed towards resource-rich countries (see Collier, 2007, p. 178;Stiglitz, 2007, p. 39). Transparency has been variously presented as a means of opening communication channels, facilitating scrutiny of revenues gathered from natural resource extraction, facilitating civil society participation in natural resource governance and promoting accountability for how resource rents are channelled into the promotion of sustainable development (Barma, Kaiser, Minh, & Vinuela, 2012, p. 4).
Yet efforts to institutionalise such global governance norms at national and sub-national scales often encounter significant challenges when global norms come into tension with established normative frameworks at local levels. Efforts to implement transparency norms on the ground have been pursued through various policies and interventions. Those include a range of strategies that seek to correct failures of resource management and develop accountable resource Poppy Sulistyaning Winanti and Hasrul Hanif Both authors contributed equally to this work. governance through the timely disclosure of government information and the enhancement of strong multi-stakeholder involvement in monitoring (Bourgouin & Haarstad, 2013, p. 91;Mejía Acosta, 2013, p. 591). As part of this broader trend, new international standards, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 1 and its progenitor, the global Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, came to the fore of reform, seeking to impede rent-seeking behaviour and corruption through the disclosure of government revenue derived from extractive sectors (Corrigan, 2014;Hendrix, 2014). Although these schemes have made significant inroads, they have also been widely contested, and implementation has been mixed. For example, existing studies have shown EITI implementation to depend on a range of factors including local institutional quality and configurations of power and interest between state, business and civil society organisations (Bourgouin & Haarstad, 2013;Gonzales-Espinosa & Klein, 2013;Vijge, Metcalfe, Wallbott, & Oberlack, 2019).
Such challenges have been the subject of an expansive body of scholarship on "norm localisation"-the central focus of this special issue. Following Acharya's influential definition (2004, p. 241), the concept of norm localisation is used here to refer to "… a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalised in a region) and local beliefs and practices." This concept provides "a framework that explains how transnational norms are contested, adapted and incorporated into a new … context" (Capie, 2008, p. 639).
While recognition that norm dynamics vary between contrasting local contexts centrally underpins the concept of norm localisation, existing scholarship on this issue has not systematically theorised how norm localisation varies across political contexts in response to contrasting political systems, regime types, or political styles. Instead, theories of norm localisation have tended to develop more general hypotheses regarding the mechanisms through which norm localisation occurs and conditions under which global norms are likely to be successfully institutionalised on the groundfocusing in particular on the importance of processes through which normative and cognitive congruence can be established between global norms and local cultural and political beliefs and practices.
To explore the robustness of such theories across a range of local political contexts, this article explores norm localisation dynamics within one particular political context that has been under-studied within existing norm localisation scholarship (cf. Bourgouin & Haarstad, 2013, p. 104), but which is highly significant for discussions of extractive industry governance: that is, newly democratised countries characterised by a populist political style. Populism can be broadly understood as a "political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). 2 Of particular relevance to this article's analysis are concepts of populism that focus on behavioural aspects of populist leadership through reference to a populist "political style" (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 14;Moffitt, 2017, p. 46;Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 388).
In contexts characterised by a populist political style, leaders rely heavily on rhetorical and performative strategies as means of building popular political support (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, pp. 387-391). Previous scholarship on populism as a political style has demonstrated that the political mobilisation of norms often plays a crucial role in underpinning the rhetorical strategies of populist leaders (see Jayasuriya, 2006, pp. 126-145;Mas'udi & Kurniawan, 2017 (Checkel, 1999;Keck & Kathryn, 1998). Particular attention was given to the role of so-called global norm entrepreneurs (Capie, 2008(Capie, , pp. 639, 2012, defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896) as agents who engage not only in normative agenda-setting, but also active promotion of norms.
As this body of scholarship evolved, the focus shifted towards an interest in actors situated at local (rather than global) levels, and the potentially crucial role of local "norm-takers" in shaping norm adoption processes. The concept of "norm takers" was coined in reference to local actors who according to Acharya (2004, p. 269) do not simply passively receive norms, but rather play a critical role in facilitating the norm adoption process. Depending on the context, these may take the form of government officials, civil society organisations or other individuals. The presence of these norm takers and their responses to global norms are now widely recognised to comprise important components of the norm localisation process.
A central focus of this evolving norm localisation scholarship has been the question of the conditions under which global norms are likely to be institutionalised at the local level in line with the original purposes of global normative agendas. One influential theoretical current has focused on the importance of normative, cognitive or cultural "fit" as a basis for explaining when global norms are likely to be accepted and institutionalised in a given local context. An important version of this account was developed by Acharya (2004), who argued that norm localisation is most likely to occur when outside norms can establish some form of congruence with established local beliefs and practices.
Similarly, Eimer et al. (2016) argued that the particular characteristics of a given localisation process will depend importantly on the interplay between international pressure and domestic preferences, while Cortell and Davis (2000) highlighted the significance of "cultural match" between international norms and domestic understandings in determining the degree to which global norms achieve traction at the local level.
Building on this broad interest in enabling conditions for norm localisation, some scholars have focused on exploring specific mechanisms through which localisation occurs. Reflecting this interest, Acharya developed a sophisticated account of the mechanisms of norm localisation, and the agency of norm-takers in such processes. Acharya (2011, p. 4) argued that norm localisation is "…a dynamic process of constitutive localisation" that enables norm-takers to build congruence between local and external norms. The concept of constitutive localisation highlights the importance of existing ideas, norms, and culture as influences on an individual or community's acceptance of new norms. Since local actors as norm-takers are not "passive targets" (Acharya, 2011, p. 7), they may modify the meaning and scope of external norms. Such modification is necessary so that the norms can be coherent with existing local beliefs and practices and can fit the circumstances and preferences of local actors. According to this view, norm localisation occurs when successful fusion occurs between foreign and local ideas. Such an account resonates strongly with broader constructivist accounts of social change that focus on "micro-processes of persuasion and social influence" instead of "strategic calculation" as determinants of normative and behavioural change (Acharya, 2011, p. 3).
Although such broadly constructivist understandings of norm localisation mechanisms have been dominant within existing norm localisation scholarship, the potential significance of more strategic drivers of norm-taking behaviour has also been recognised. For example, Cortell & Davis (2000, pp. 76-77)  Analysis focuses on norm localisation in the Indonesian Regency of Bojonegoroa resource-abundant district in the province of East Java. Bojonegoro is a particularly appropriate location for studying norm localisation dynamics, since compared with other resource-rich districts in Indonesia, Bojonegoro has been a major focus of interest and concern for many international donors and civil society organisations seeking to implement transparency initiatives, such as the World Bank, PWYP, Tifa Foundation, and the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). This focus can be explained in part by the fact that the discovery of large reserves of oil and gas in Bojonegoro coincided in temporal terms with the rise of global attention to the so-called "resource curse," and associated efforts by international actors to promote transparency as part of a broader good governance agenda. In contrast, most oil-rich regions in Indonesia have been exploited since the oil boom era in the 1970s (see Smith, 2007).
The authors collected the data through several methods. Not only did this environment mitigate against strong resistance to transparency norms, it also created opportunities for strong collaborative work between state actors and civil society organisations. Civil society organisations emerged as leading pro-democracy actors in Indonesia in the late 1990s, gaining significant legitimacy as reform actors that could support the development of democracy and the promotion of good governance in Indonesia's emerging democracy (see Budiman & Törnquist, 2001;Mietzner, 2012). The dominance of an international agenda of global-development-cum-good-governance gave primacy to discourses of "social capital,""partnership" and "public participation" as core elements of the global development agenda.
This positioned civil society organisations as key agents of governance reform, mobilisation of public participation and implementation of development programs (Carroll & Jarvis, 2015b, p. 292). In this context, vibrant civil society organisations mushroomed (Suharko, 2011, p. 463), building on established cross-organisational networks, and expanding such networks globally through new links with international NGOs and donors (Savirani, 2015;Subono, Priyono, & Samadhi, 2007). In short, the increasing number of global and domestic civil society networks, and their capacity to influence public discourse across a range of issues, gave Indonesian CSOs increased credibility and leverage in public affairs, particularly in the spheres of policy advocacy and global norm promotion, positioning these civil society networks as credible insider proponents of global norms promoting strengthened 'good governance' in the public sphere (see Hanif, 2013, p. 137).
Transparency norms were institutionalised in various ways by the national government, as part of these broader reform agendas.
The emergence of a distinctive style of populist politics in Indonesia responded in part to demands for more people-oriented political leaders, amidst a new democratic politics in the country. Introduction in 2005 of direct elections for the gubernur (head of the provincial government) and bupati/walikota (head of the district/municipality) intensified pressures for local rulers to respond to citizen' demands in order to sustain their political support and legitimacy (Sulistiyanto & Erb, 2009). Pressure for reform also came from a range of international organisations, donors and development agencies that promoted decentralisation and "good governance" reform agendas in Indonesia (Hanif & Pratikno, 2012, pp. 193-195). Bojonegoro being traditional Moslems. By embracing the global transparency agenda, Suyoto hoped not only to gain more support from civil society organisations, but also wider political support from grassroots groups and swing voters (Abdullah, 2014, p. 56). In this sense, adoption of transparency in Bojonegoro rested importantly on the norm's potential to serve as a political "vehicle" for Suyoto, as a local leader who had not yet secured sufficient popular support (cf. Acharya, 2004, p. 248 Acharya, 2011, p. 13;Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). The supporting coalition of CSOs framed the risk of a potential local resource curse in public deliberations, for instance, using phrases such as "escaping the resource curse" and "preventing the resource curse" in public campaigns, discussions and many public meetings in Bojonegoro. 16 Furthermore, Suyoto attempted to convince other local actors that transparency offered a compelling panacea for a range of problems experienced by resource-rich regions in Indonesia. Suyoto often stated in various public meetings that without transparency, resource extraction was likely to generate social conflict and instability at the grassroots level. 17 He pointed to previous experiences of Indonesian resource-rich regions, highlighting the Janus-faced nature of extractive industries. On the one hand, extractive activities potentially contribute to local economic development, yet on the other hand, local people frequently experience significant social and environmental burdens, such as the loss of their primary income or other source of livelihood due to land acquisition for oil and gas projects. In an interview with an OGP official, he made a statement that mirrored a sentiment repeated in many other public meetings 18 : By emphasising the resource curse as a threat to society and offering his transparency agenda as a potential means of preventing future crises, Suyoto was thus able to use the global transparency agenda as a means of strengthening his own populist support base. A similar propensity to side-step transparency norms that conflicted with his political interests was reflected in Suyoto's approach to constituting a multi-stakeholder steering committee, which the OGP requires as a means of facilitating transparency and participation of representatives from local government, CSOs activists, private sector and academia. As reported by the OGP's Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM), this committee incorporated limited participation from CSOs, academics, or local parliament members, weakening the transparency and accountability of local governance processes (Novenanto, 2017).
Second, significant limits to the adoption of global transparency norms were evident in relation to processes surrounding implementation of the local regulation on Transparency of Revenue, Environment, and Corporate Social Responsibility of Oil and Gas Exploitation, discussed above. In this case, methods of implementation further revealed a lack of commitment to principles of public transparency and accountability that would enable non-state actors, particularly civil society organisations, to exercise influence over policy-making (see Aaronson, 2011, pp. 53-54).

| DISCUSSION
As the article's analysis of empirical results has demonstrated, norm localisation processes in this case were contingent on several interacting processes. First, at a macro-level, there had been a major domestic political change from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, which served as a structural catalyst to create demand for new norms. Transparency norms proved congruent in many ways with the needs of the community in the post-authoritarian regime, which craved access to information and opportunities to improve their welfare.  ENDNOTES 1 EITI is an international initiative to mitigate the resource curse in resource-rich countries (Kasekende, Abuka, & Sarr, 2016) that aims primarily to reduce corruption in extractive industry through the improvement of transparency, the EITI is designed as a voluntary scrutiny mechanism (Klein, 2017). For further information on the EITI scheme, see https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publica tions/extractive-industries-transparency-initiative-eiti. Accessed 4th May 2017.
2 "Populism" is a contentious political concept. Many existing studies of populism have focused on analysing populist ideology, discourses and political and organisational strategies. Such features have been shown to vary widely, encompassing both left and right ideologies, and strategies based on both loose networks and tight forms of party discipline (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 381). Other scholars have focused on behavioural aspects of performance or rhetoric, through reference to a populist political style (cf. Bonikowski, 2016, p. 14;Moffitt, 2017, p. 46;Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 388). The latter is the primary focus of this article's analysis. 6 RegINA, is the Asia-Pacific Knowledge Hub for Better Governance in Extractive Industries, based in the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia, supported by the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), which was merged with the Natural Resource Charter and re-branded as the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) in 2014. 7 The NRGI served as the coordinating institution and hub to facilitate norm diffusion not only in Indonesia, but also across the entire Southeast Asia region. PWYP-Indonesia also developed a resource governance knowledge centre to facilitate the transmission of global norms and discourses from PWYP-Global to members of PWYP-Indonesia and government (national and local government).