Suspicion of Welfare Overuse in Sweden: The Role of Left–Right Ideology, Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Gender

In this study, we explore individual differences in suspicion of welfare overuse in Sweden. Focusing on previously underdeveloped areas, we find that the hitherto observed negative relationship between political interest and suspicion of welfare overuse is only valid for those who sympathize with political parties to the left (and to a lesser extent the Green Party). Conversely, individuals who sympathize with centre-right parties or right-wing populists differ little internally depending on their level of political interest. We also find a strong positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion about welfare overuse. Finally, we find that women are less suspicious of welfare overuse than men are, and that this cannot be attributed to gender differences in material risks or resources, education, experiences of welfare services, general trustfulness, anti-immigrant sentiment or political orientation. Neither do gender differences vary according to strength of gender identification. Thus, being suspicious about welfare overuse is not likely to be perceived as a typically masculine or feminine posture. Based on our findings, we argue that future studies exploring partisan or ideological differences in perceptions of welfare overuse need to consider these in conjunction with political interest and political context; that rising anti-immigrant sentiments pose a particularly serious threat to the legitimacy of welfare states, given their strong connectedness to suspicion of welfare overuse; and that gender differences in perceptions of welfare overuse are more fruitfully addressed through a lens of gender relations, rather than gender role stereotypes.

In this study, we explore individual differences in suspicion of welfare overuse in Sweden.Focusing on previously underdeveloped areas, we find that the hitherto observed negative relationship between political interest and suspicion of welfare overuse is only valid for those who sympathize with political parties to the left (and to a lesser extent the Green Party).Conversely, individuals who sympathize with centre-right parties or right-wing populists differ little internally depending on their level of political interest.We also find a strong positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion about welfare overuse.Finally, we find that women are less suspicious of welfare overuse than men are, and that this cannot be attributed to gender differences in material risks or resources, education, experiences of welfare services, general trustfulness, anti-immigrant sentiment or political orientation.Neither do gender differences vary according to strength of gender identification.Thus, being suspicious about welfare overuse is not likely to be perceived as a typically masculine or feminine posture.Based on our findings, we argue that future studies exploring partisan or ideological differences in perceptions of welfare overuse need to consider these in conjunction with political interest and political context; that rising anti-immigrant sentiments pose a particularly serious threat to the legitimacy of welfare states, given their strong connectedness to suspicion of welfare overuse; and that gender differences in perceptions of welfare overuse are more fruitfully addressed through a lens of gender relations, rather than gender role stereotypes.
Welfare overuse is the intentional (and unintentional) misuse of welfare benefits by individuals.As such, perceptions of widespread free-riding and abuse constitute potential threats to the legitimacy and public support that encompassing and tax-funded welfare states rely on (Rothstein 1998;2011).Yet, while government policies on combatting of welfare overuse are often motivated by a dual appeal to morality and to addressing the threat to welfare state legitimacy, it is often the case that the public's perception of welfare overuse is taken as an approximate evaluation of actual levels of overuse (e.g., Lundström 2011).We find this to be a problematic approach, as reliable information on actual levels of welfare overuse is generally little known to the public (if available at all), combined with the fact that people's perceptions about abstract phenomena are generally prone to influence by political rhetoric.Indeed, it has been found that beliefs about welfare overuse systematically vary between welfare regimes and groups of people within countries, and with individual dispositions (Roosma et al. 2016).Within the welfare state literature in general, the concept of overuse perception is instead often treated as attitudes (towards target groups) (e.g., van Oorschot et al. 2017).
Given the above, our overall aim is to increase knowledge about why individuals differ in suspicion of welfare overuse as an attitudinal construct.On the individual level, previous research has largely focused on material inequalities, own experiences and trust in explaining why people differ in their beliefs about welfare overuse.In this article we identify and expand on three underdeveloped themes in the research on welfare overuse perceptions: (i) political ideology and articulation, (ii) anti-immigrant attitudes and (iii) gender identification.
First, previous research has identified individuals' level of interest in politics as a predictor of low overuse perceptions (Svallfors 1996), while also pointing to a general left-right ideological division (Svallfors 1996;van Oorschot & Meuleman 2012;Roosma et al. 2014;2016).However, the way in which political ideology and partisanship interact with personal political interest has so far not been explored.Given that most issues concerning the welfare state tend to be politically polarized, and that information on levels of welfare overuse is scarce, we argue that public beliefs about the magnitude of this problem are particularly susceptible to elite rhetoric and the way that welfare overuse issue is framed politically.In line with the theorizing on political-elite rhetoric (e.g., Zaller 1992), we argue that partisan differences should be most evident among individuals who have a high degree of political interest, because they are more likely to adhere to politicized framings of the abstract issue of welfare overuse than less politically interested individuals.
Second, a growing body of research points to the significance of a non-economic ideological dimension, namely, sociocultural orientation, for understanding welfare state attitudes.Previous studies have found a relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes, increased welfare chauvinism and general distrust (e.g., Goldschmidt 2017).Yet, so far, anti-immigrant attitudes have not been explored in relation to suspicion of welfare overuse.As trust between people and in the system is foundational to how people generally perceive benefit recipients (e.g., van Oorschot et al. 2017), and given the emphasis on migrants in the recent Swedish debate on welfare overuse (Lundström 2011), we expect to find a strong correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion of welfare overuse.
Third, we focus on the role of gender, which is an often undertheorized aspect of welfare overuse suspicion.We specifically focus on strength of gender identification, to uncover whether being suspicious of welfare overuse is perceived of as a typically masculine (or feminine) posture.Previous research suggests that encompassing, individualized welfare states such as Sweden tend to have relatively large gender differences in welfare state attitudes, due to a connection between welfare state arrangements, gender relations and gender differences in welfare state reliance (Goossen 2020).Based on the notion that experiences connected to such gender differences influence the propensity to identify with welfare beneficiaries (and other needy groups in society), we also argue that gender differences in suspicion of welfare overuse exist above and beyond factors related to self-interest and individual dispositions.
Using data from the most recent Swedish Welfare Survey from 2018, we conduct a series of regression models analysing the relationship between our theoretically informed explanatory variables and an index measuring individuals' suspicion of welfare overuse.

Explaining Suspicion of Welfare Overuse: Previous Approaches
Despite the harmful implications of free-riding for tax-funded welfare states, the research on welfare overuse perceptions is a relatively small and recent phenomenon.At its current state, research is mainly exploratory and empirically driven.While, strictly speaking, the study object is a form of evaluation (about the magnitude of overuse), its theory is mostly derived from the field of welfare state attitudes (often framed as attitudes towards target groups) (e.g., van Oorschot et al. 2017).The rationale is twofold in that accurate information about welfare overuse is either hard to come by or little known to the public, and that research has demonstrated considerable differences in overuse perceptions between countries, groups and individuals with different characteristics (Roosma et al. 2016).In the following, we briefly outline what we know so far about suspicion of welfare overuse.
Concerning the individual level, which is the focus of this paper, welfare deservingness theory (van Oorschot et al. 2017) states that people tend to support social policy to the extent that target groups are perceived of as deserving.Connected to this, identification theory (Maassen & De Goede 1989) states that the risk of becoming dependent on welfare benefits may prompt a better ability to identify with recipients of welfare benefits and services.Roosma and colleagues (2016) interpret this as leading to less suspicion, as identification with recipients makes one view them more favourably.However, instead of decreasing suspicion of overuse, the risk of becoming dependent on welfare benefits may instead prompt feelings of competition over resources, thus increasing suspicion.This corresponds to competition theory (Maassen & De Goede 1989), which assumes that people in structurally exposed positions become more watchful of potential misuse.Research has typically demonstrated that lower occupational class and own benefit recipiency is associated with less suspicion of welfare overuse (Roosma et al. 2016).
Another perspective comes from the vast literature on collective action, which stresses that cooperation requires trust in an actor (i.e., the state) to guarantee that the same rules apply to and are followed by all (or most) transacting actors in the system (e.g., Ostrom 2000;Falk & Fischbacher 2006).Thus, there must be trust both in institutions to (be able to) uphold the social contract and in other people not to seek out free-riding opportunities (e.g., Falk & Fischbacher 2006;Rothstein 2011).Translated into the problem of welfare overuse, this implies that if there is low trust in institutions (concerning, e.g., accuracy or oversight capabilities), or if one does not generally trust other people to do what is right, suspicion of welfare overuse should be high.Indeed, previous research demonstrates that both institutional trust and social trust are negatively related to suspicion of welfare overuse (e.g., Roosma et al. 2016).
Research has also demonstrated ideological differences, with party identification and ideological self-placement to the right being connected to high levels of overuse perceptions (Svallfors 1996;van Oorschot & Meuleman 2012;Roosma et al. 2014;2016).Mainly, this is attributed to preferences about the redistribution profile of the welfare state, with left voters perceiving access to welfare as too strict, and thus potential overuse as a lesser problem.However, this is not elaborated on in relation to how left and right political parties address issues of welfare overuse in their rhetoric.While overall negative collective images about welfare recipients seem to be connected to high overuse perceptions (Roosma et al. 2016), we do not know whether differences in political articulation about welfare overuse plays into this.

Explaining Suspicion of Welfare Overuse: Expanding the Analytical Framework
In sum, the research reviewed above has predominantly focused on a combination of structural vulnerability and processes of identification with welfare recipients, as well as various types of trust when attempting to understand suspicion of welfare overuse.In this article, we are mainly concerned with expanding the analytical framework.We specifically address three neglected areas: the complex interplay between partisanship, political rhetoric and individuals' interest in politics; anti-immigrant attitudes; and 119 gender and gender identification.As previous research has demonstrated that several factors may play into overuse perceptions, our approach is not reductionist.Therefore, we do not claim that our chosen perspectives are exhaustive, only that they contribute to a more refined and comprehensive analysis of why individuals are suspicious about welfare overuse.

Partisanship, Political Articulation and Political Interest
First, we argue that by combining insights into the relation between political ideology and suspicion of overuse, with the degree to which people are attentive to political rhetoric, we can increase knowledge about individual-level differences in suspicion of welfare overuse.We start by outlining how the topic of welfare overuse has been articulated in welfare policy debates in the Swedish context.
Often described as a prime example of the social democratic welfare state, defined primarily by a focus on universal and actuarial principles, and few residual benefit programs, Sweden was prior to the 1990s marked by a lack of public debate about welfare overuse and fraud (Svallfors 1996).Starting in the early 1990s, at a moment in time marked by rising economic uncertainty and an upsurge in right-wing populism combined with a decline in support for social democracy, discussions about welfare abuse started to emerge also in the Swedish context (Lundström 2011).Focusing primarily on welfare abuse and cheating among immigrants and leniency in migration policies, the issue was controversially introduced by the right-wing populist party Ny demokrati [New Democracy], at the time highly contentious but ultimately short lived (Brune 2001).Following continued economic recession, and a much-publicized government report on welfare abuse in 1995 (RRV), the issue of widespread overuse within (primarily) the unemployment program was also taken up by established (mostly right-wing) political interests for the first time in the Swedish context.As a consequence, the social democratic government introduced a number of measures to counter system abuse, and as the economy recovered and unemployment levels fell over the next couple of years, the issue once again became more peripheral in character.
Underpinned once again by government reports (RFV 2004), the issue of overuse within the health insurance program emerged as an issue characterized by salient left-right cleavages and gained striking momentum during 2002-2005 as a core rhetoric tenet of the then newly formed centre-right political Alliance coalition.Additional policy changes to combat abuse, including significant cuts in levels of provision across core programs then followed, and especially so after the centre-right Alliance came into government in 2006 (Johnson 2010).After these changes, and coinciding with low unemployment levels and more favourable economic circumstances, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 44 -No. 2, 2021 the issue of widespread welfare overuse among the general public has not received the same level of political and media attention (Lundström 2011).
However, as populist right-wing sentiments have re-emerged, marked by the rise of a nationalist party, the Sweden Democrats, the issue of welfare abuse among immigrants has gained renewed importance recently.While not a key topic in the mainstream media, and rarely debated between the established parties, this issue is provided discursive space on alternative media platforms, such as citizen journalist blogs (Lundström 2013), commonly employed by the populist right-wing movement (Holt 2019).
Based on the above, we argue that perceptions about welfare overuse constitute one of several ideologically loaded dimensions of the welfare state.In the unidimensional Swedish political system, political parties and party competition have traditionally been structured by the left-right dimension (Oscarsson & Holmberg 2016), with welfare policies constituting a core theme of national politics (Svallfors 2011) As the Swedish political system has long been marked by a left-right ideological struggle over the scope and nature of the welfare state (see e.g., Korpi and Palme 1998) it is not surprising that previous studies (Swedish as well as international) have found partisanship and ideological orientations to be closely related to people's perceptions about welfare overuse.Generally, ideological self-placement and party identification to the right is associated with substantially more suspicion about welfare overuse (Svallfors 1996;van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012;Roosma et al. 2014;2016).
However, one largely overlooked factor when assessing the relationship between partisanship and suspicion of welfare overuse is the extent to which individuals are interested in politics and thereby exposed to political-elite rhetoric.While it is reasonable to assume that politically interested individuals should be more knowledgeable about politics and the welfare 121 system in general, which could lead to less suspicion about welfare overuse (see e.g., Svallfors 1996), we argue that political interest should primarily be understood as a moderating factor, influencing the strength of the relationship between partisanship and suspicion of welfare overuse.
Our argument is based on the literature on elite rhetoric and attitude formation, which suggests that political elites can dominate public attitude formation on abstract political issues, since people tend to turn to their political leaders and parties for guidance when deciding what to think about abstract and politically polarized issues (Zaller 1992;Tesler 2018).This notion, furthermore, bears many similarities with the literature on motivated political reasoning, which suggests that individuals tend to interpret information differently, depending on their existing ideological orientations (Baekgaard et al. 2017).
In sum, we argue that the lack of accessible information about welfare overuse makes this an abstract and easily politicized issue, where political elites have the potential to shape public opinion.Based on theories about political-elite rhetoric and the salience of the left-right dimension and welfare policies in Swedish politics, we expect that while public attitudes towards welfare overuse are politically polarized (as shown in previous studies), this polarization should be particularly distinct among individuals who are attentive to political-elite rhetoric.

Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the role of non-economic ideological orientations in relation to welfare state attitudes (see e.g., Häusermann & Kriesi 2015;2020).In contrast to the traditional left-right dimension discussed above, which mainly concerns economic issues relating to material resources, redistribution and welfare, this alternative dimension captures non-economic value orientations related to concepts such as authority, liberalism and the rights of minority groups.This sociocultural dimension has been shown to be quite unrelated to the traditional socioeconomic dimension, in the sense that workers and supporters of left parties, who tend to be in favour of economic redistribution and encompassing welfare schemes, often display rather conservative value orientations when it comes to views on democracy, authorities and the rights of minority groups (Svallfors 2006;Häusermann & Kriesi 2015).
In the wake of recent European mass immigration, the related concept of 'welfare chauvinism' (i.e., limiting immigrants' access to welfare benefits compared to natives or citizens) has gained increasing attention in the welfare state literature.The link between such chauvinistic and anti-immigrant attitudes, on the one hand, and general support for the welfare state, on the other, is not clear-cut.While some studies have found that anti-immigrant 122 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 44 -No. 2, 2021 attitudes tend to be related to stronger welfare state support (e.g., Ervasti et al. 2008), other studies have found the opposite (e.g., Goldschmidt 2017).
One explanation for the results showing that anti-immigrant attitudes are related to stronger welfare state support could be that the groups typically endorsing high levels of social spending and an encompassing welfare state (such as workers, those with low educational attainment, and supporters of left parties) often tend to display quite negative attitudes towards minority groups such as immigrants (Svallfors 2006;Ervasti et al. 2008).However, regarding perceptions of welfare overuse, there is reason to expect a positive relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion.The literature on welfare deservingness indeed demonstrates that there is a strong link between anti-immigrant attitudes and negative perceptions about the deservingness of target groups, such as immigrants (see e.g., van Oorschot 2006).For example, in a study by Van der Waal and colleagues (2010), the authors showed that individuals who perceive cultural diversity as a threat tend to be more distrusting and restrictive regarding the deservingness of different target groups.Further, Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) demonstrated that welfare chauvinism, anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion about welfare misuse constitute key components of a single underlying dimension of cultural orientations among the populations of most European countries.
Based on the above, we therefore expect that not only ideological orientations in the traditional economic sense, but also orientations along the sociocultural dimension, and especially anti-immigrant attitudes, should play a crucial (but somewhat neglected) role in explaining individual-level variation in suspicion about welfare overuse among Swedes.

Gender Relations and Gender Identification
Finally, gender constitutes an undertheorized aspect of suspicion about welfare overuse.With respect to this dimension, we identify two relevant perspectives.In the first instance, gender differences in overuse perceptions can be seen as related to both self-interest and normative views rooted in everyday experiences of gender relations.Here, women are expected to be less suspicious than men because of their structurally more exposed situation in relation to the welfare state, which is connected to higher propensity for identification with and less mistrust of target groups.An alternative view is to conceptualize overuse perceptions as related to gender role stereotypes, where suspicion is more aligned with a masculine gender role stereotype.Here, men and women are expected to differ more, the more strongly they identify with their respective gender group.
According to institutional theories on policy feedback, existing policies can construct groups of beneficiaries and bestow on them a sense of identity and shared interests, in turn, affecting policy support (Mettler & Soss 123 2004;Svallfors 2007).In Sweden, the women's movement's articulation about the welfare state as a gender equality project (aligned with the vision of the 'woman-friendly state') (Hernes 1987) is highly institutionalized through policies and state strategies aimed at promoting gender equality and ameliorating work-family tensions (Borchorst & Siim 2008;Ferrarini & Duvander 2010;Earles 2011).Previous research has demonstrated that where welfare states contribute to more equal gender relations, women are more positive towards encompassing welfare states in comparison to men (Goossen 2020).
However, recognizing the interplay of social policy and gender relations, it is also reasonable to argue that women are more structurally dependent than men are on a continuance of welfare state solutions for access to the labour market and for mitigating work-family tensions (e.g., O'Connor 1993; Korpi et al. 2013).Indeed, even though women's employment in Sweden is among the highest in the world, women continue to hold the main responsibility for unpaid care and household labour (e.g., Ferrarini & Duvander 2010; Earles 2011).Thus, women's positions as earners are arguably more unstable and threatened by welfare state retrenchment in comparison with men's (an instability that further implies risk of economic dependency on a spouse during family formation and child rearing).
In contexts such as Sweden, where all adults are expected to participate in paid labour, and the male family wages of the industrial era are but a distant memory, women are therefore expected to be heavily invested in individualized welfare state policies (e.g., Ferrarini & Duvander 2010; Earles 2011).More to the point, as women's partly emancipated position in this regard to some extent depends on the welfare state taking on a larger share of care functions, identification theory (Maassen & De Goede 1989) and deservingness theory (van Oorschot et al. 2017) expect that women's experiences make them more likely to identify with and show solidarity with welfare recipients, thus holding less suspicion of overuse, as a consequence.
Another possible explanation for gender differences is that some welfare state attitudes are experienced as more feminine or masculine in their character, as a way of 'doing gender' (West & Zimmerman 1987).For example, previous research has shown that women generally prefer socially compassionate policies and men are more in favour of system justification attitudes that legitimize social inequality (Sidianus et al. 2004;Diekman & Schneider 2010).However, it has also been demonstrated that the relationship between gender and preference for social dominance of out-groups is moderated by strength of gender identification (Snellman et al. 2009).
In line with this perspective, we want to test whether being suspicious of out-groups might be perceived as a masculine posture, aligned with the social contents of a masculine stereotypical gender role-while being trusting and showing solidarity with society's less fortunate might be more 124 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.44 -No.2, 2021 aligned with a feminine stereotypical gender role.If this is indeed the case, we argue that gender differences should be moderated by strength of gender identification, with gender differences being more pronounced among individuals with a stronger gender identification.

Hypotheses
We formulate four specific hypotheses.Previous research has demonstrated that, aligned with partisan differences in political articulation, sympathizers of political parties to the left are less suspicious about welfare overuse than right-wing sympathizers.Furthermore, personal interest in politics is associated with less suspicion overall.However, we argue that a person's political interest influences attentiveness to how welfare overuse issues are articulated by the political representatives that they most identify with, thus moderating the strength and direction of the relationship between partisanship and suspicion of welfare overuse.We hypothesize that H1: The association between political party identification and suspicion of welfare overuse depends on individuals' level of political interest.We expect larger partisan differences between individuals who are very interested in politics, and less difference between individuals who are not interest in politics.
Based on the findings that anti-immigrant attitudes are correlated with welfare chauvinism and general distrust, we similarly expect anti-immigrant attitudes to be connected with high suspicion of welfare overuse.
H2: Anti-immigrant attitudes are positively correlated with suspicion of welfare overuse.
Drawing upon theorization about gender differences in reliance on the welfare state, and the increased propensity for women over men to identify with welfare state beneficiaries under such conditions, we expect women to be less suspicious than men about welfare overuse.
H3a: Women are less, and men are more, suspicious of welfare overuse.
However, aligned with contemporary social role theory, we also hypothesize that the relationship between gender and overuse perceptions is contingent on the relative strength of a person's gender identification.
H3b: Gender differences in suspicion of welfare overuse are larger among individuals with strong gender identification.

Data and Analytical strategy
We used data from the latest round of the Swedish Welfare State Survey (SWS).The postal survey was collected in 2018 and aimed at gauging the adult Swedish population's attitudes towards the welfare state (response rate was 33 percent).After cleaning, our achieved sample was n = 1,461. 1Distribution in terms of gender, age, region, occupational class and immigrant background can be found in Table 1.
To investigate our hypotheses, we constructed a series of OLS regression models, with a continuous measure of suspicion of welfare overuse as dependent variable.In the models, we entered and removed the independent variables in steps.First, we utilized only sociodemographic variables (Model 0), which were then retained as control variables in each successive model.We then entered, in blocks, party identification and political interest (Model 1), interaction terms between political interest and party identification (Model 2), an index measuring anti-immigrant attitudes (controlled for immigrant background) (Model 3), and an index measuring strength of gender identification as well as an interaction term between gender and this measure (Model 4).Finally, we included all the variables in a single model (Model 5), plus controls for social and institutional trust and individual experience of benefit recipiency.We utilized standard list-wise deletion of missing values. 2

Dependent Variable
We measured suspicion about welfare overuse by asking respondents to state whether they (1) Completely agree, (2) Somewhat agree, (3) Somewhat disagree or (4) Completely disagree with the following five statements: Many who use health care are not really sick, Many who receive unemployment benefits could get a job if they just wanted to, Many who receive social assistance are not really poor, Many who receive housing benefits should move to smaller and cheaper accommodations, and Many who receive sick pay are not really sick.We reverse-coded the items and created an index (Cronbach's α = .889)by taking the mean over all items and standardizing the scores to run 0 to 100 (with 100 being high suspicion).A factor analysis revealed that the separate indicators all loaded on a single factor (eigenvalue: 3.467; 69.33   Political interest was measured with two questions: How often do discussions about politics occur among your family and friends, or at your workplace?Answer: (1) Very often, (2) Fairly often, (3) Not that often, (4) Not at all, (5) Don't know; and How often do you use media (TV, newspapers, radio, Internet) to partake of information or news about politics?Answer: (1) Never, (2) Rarely, (3) Often, (4) Every day.Thereafter, we constructed an index (Cronbach's α = .594)by taking the mean of both items and standardizing it to run 0 to 1 (1 = high political interest).

Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
Anti-immigrant attitudes was an index (Cronbach's α = .751)comprising answers to the three following statements: Sweden should limit immigration in order to preserve Swedish values and our way of life, It is impossible for people who do not share Swedish customs and traditions to become completely Swedish, and Legal immigrants in Sweden who are not citizens should have the same access to welfare systems as Swedish citizens.Answers: (1) Completely agree, (2) Agree, (3) Neither agree nor disagree, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree, (6) Don't know (missing).Answers to the last question were reverse-coded to indicate higher anti-immigrant attitudes.We took the mean over all items, standardizing it to run 0 to 1 (1 = high anti-immigrant attitudes).
For all models with anti-immigrant attitudes, we also included a control variable for immigrant background, distinguishing between those with both parents born in Sweden (0) and those with either or both parents born outside of Sweden (1).

Gender and Gender Identification
Gender was a binary variable distinguishing between women (1) and men (0, reference category).Strength of gender identification was operationalized using an adaptation of a subscale to the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker 1992).Respondents were asked to state to what extent they disagreed or agreed with the following: My sex/gender identity … overall has very little to do with how I feel about myself, … is an important

reflection of who I am, … is unimportant to my feeling of what kind of a person I am, … is an important part of my self-image.
Respondents answered on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly disagree, to (7) Strongly agree.The first and third items were reverse-coded.We constructed an index (Cronbach's α = .751)by taking the group (gender) mean over all items and standardizing it to run between 0 and 1 (1 = strong gender identification).

Control Variables Sociodemographic Variables
We used four variables to capture relevant sociodemographic cleavages: Age group, Region, Education and Occupational class.Occupational class was operationalized using a collapsed version of Statistics Sweden's socioeconomic classification system, distinguishing Workers (skilled and unskilled manual labour), Non-manual employees (assistant and intermediate non-manual employees, professionals, higher civil servants, executives), Self-employed and Farmers.

Experience of Benefit Recipiency
Recipiency was measured using a dichotomized variable indicating whether the respondent had experienced any of the following during the last 36 months: Being admitted to a hospital, Being unemployed (at least one month), Being on sick leave for at least 1 month, Receiving social assistance.

Trust
Institutional trust was operationalized using five questions where the respondents rated their trust in the following institutions and groups: the police, health care services, parliament, politicians and the tax authority.Answers: (1) Very low trust, (2) Fairly low trust, (3) Fairly high trust, (4) Very high trust, (5) Don't know (missing).We constructed a mean index (Cronbach's α = .755),running 0 to 1 (1 = high institutional trust).Social trust was operationalized by asking the respondents to rate whether Most people can be trusted or You cannot be careful enough.Respondents answered on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (cannot be careful enough) to 1 (most people can be trusted).

Results
Starting with observations from the sociodemographic model (Model 0, Table 2), the most significant predictors of suspicion of welfare overuse are gender (women are less suspicious than men), education (those with upper secondary and tertiary education are less suspicious compared to those with basic education) and region (those living in rural areas are less suspicious than all others).While it does seem that non-manual employees are less 130 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 44 -No. 2, 2021 suspicious than manual workers and the self-employed when looking at the simple means for suspicion of welfare overuse (reported in Table 1), any class differences seem to dissipate when controlling for gender, age, region and education.
Turning to our first hypothesis, we expect that partisan differences in suspicion of welfare overuse should be most accentuated among individuals with a high degree of interest in politics.First, we observe in Model 2 (Table 2) that, on average, individuals who sympathize with either left or green political parties are less suspicious than those that identify with centre-right parties (differences are rather large, spanning −15.6 to −13.1 points on the 0-100 suspicion index).However, individuals who sympathize with the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats are, on average, more suspicious of welfare overuse (8.8 points positive difference).We also note that being interested in politics is associated with less suspicion (with a one standard deviation increase translating into a −3.6 point negative difference compared to the scale mean).
Introducing interaction terms between party identification and political interest (Model 2), we observe that for both left and green party sympathizers, more political interest equals less suspicion of welfare overuse (one standard deviation above the scale mean equals a −7.7 and an −8.5 point negative difference compared to the effect for centre-right sympathizers).However, for centre-right sympathizers, personal interest in politics does not seem to matter in relation to suspicion of welfare overuse (-.21).Politically interested sympathizers of the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats demonstrate a slight bump in suspicion of welfare overuse compared to centre-right sympathizers, but with large standard errors this estimate is not particularly useful for discriminating between centre-right and right-wing populist sympathizers in this regard.
Controlling for all other variables in a full model (Model 5), we again observe no real difference within the group of centre-right sympathizers depending on their personal interest in politics (-.48), while again, sympathizers of left parties (i.e., the Left Party and Social Democrats) are less suspicious of welfare overuse the more interested in politics they are.These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1 below.Here we also observe that among those with below-average interest in politics, there are no true partisan differences in suspicion of welfare overuse.However, controlling for all other variables, the standard error for Green Party sympathizers is inflated, making the interaction term with personal political interest less reliable as a predictor of overuse perception.In sum, we observe larger differences between persons with above-average interest in politics, thus partially confirming Hypothesis 1.However, a more correct observation is that this difference is primarily driven by left (and to a lesser extent green) sympathizers,

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as political interest seem to matter little to those who sympathize with centre-right or right-wing populist parties.
Turning to our second hypothesis, we expect a positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion about welfare overuse.In Model 3, Table 2, we observe a sizeable relationship between these two variables.Holding above-average anti-immigrant attitudes is associated with more suspicion of welfare overuse (one standard deviation above the scale mean translates into a positive difference of 14 points for the index measuring suspicion).This relationship holds when controlling for all other variables, including partisanship, political interest, own previous benefit recipiency, and social and institutional trust (Model 5, illustrated in Figure 2).The latter is especially interesting to note.Previous research concludes that institutional trust is a significant predictor of overuse perception.Indeed, running Model 5, but without anti-immigrant attitudes, confirms this (not shown).However, in a model with anti-immigrant attitudes, institutional trust fails to reach the standard 95 percent statistical significance.While this does not mean that the point estimate is zero, the level of uncertainty caused by internal heterogeneity combined with the relatively small size of the estimate means that institutional trust adds little to predicting levels of suspicion about welfare overuse, beyond anti-immigrant attitudes.In sum, Hypothesis 2 predicting a positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion of welfare overuse is accepted.
One interesting observation is that the initial difference in suspicion of welfare overuse between right-wing populist and centre-right sympathizers (Model 1 and 2) is substantially smaller when controlling for anti-immigrant attitudes, trust and welfare recipiency (Model 5).As the correlation between right-wing populist sympathizers and anti-immigrant attitudes amounts to r = -.47 (p < .001),one tentative explanation is that the face-value difference may be a function of differing levels of anti-immigrant attitudes among sympathizers.Indeed, a one-way ANOVA (F = 114.589,p < .001)concludes that right-wing populist sympathizers are generally higher in anti-immigrant attitudes (mean = .80)compared to centre-right sympathizers (mean = .49).
Finally, we address our last two hypotheses.Here we expect that all else being equal, men are more and women are less, suspicious about welfare overuse (Hypothesis 3a).We also expect gender differences to be larger among individuals with a strong gender identification (Hypothesis 3b).First, we can see that in all models women are less suspicious than men are, with the difference ranging from −4.85 (Table 2, Model 0) to −2.15 (Model 3).Controlling for sociodemographic variables and anti-immigrant attitudes in combination (Model 3) does inflate the standard error somewhat, resulting in a larger confidence interval for the estimate (95% CI, −4.35; .06).This means that when assessed in conjunction with these parameters, predictions based on gender are less precise.However, in the full model containing all 134 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.44 -No.2, 2021 independent variables and controls (Model 5), standard errors and corresponding significance values are below the conventional threshold of p < .05.We conclude that gender is a robust predictor in relation to suspicion of welfare overuse, and that, as hypothesized, women are less and men are more, suspicious about welfare overuse.Thus, Hypothesis 3a is accepted.
Regarding strength of gender identification, we observe little of value.The simple effect for men does have a slight positive slope (one standard deviation above the mean equalling a positive difference of 1.6 for suspicion of welfare overuse).However, standard errors are high, and the difference in slope between men and women is negligible (-.21) and not statistically significant (p = .872).Hypothesis 3b is rejected in full.

Robustness Checks
While operationalizing latent constructs as indices by taking the mean over several ordinal variables (thus approximating interval variables) is generally deemed unproblematic in parametric statistics (e.g., Norman 2010), we still wanted to test whether an alternative operationalization would yield  2). 135 different results.Comparing models based on mean indices to similar models based on additive indices, looking at the fully standardized coefficients (i.e., partial correlations), we were able to draw the same conclusions based on direction and relative size of the estimates (results available from the corresponding author upon request).

Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to increase our knowledge about why individuals differ in their suspicion about welfare overuse.Specifically, we aimed to move beyond previous explanatory approaches to suspicion of welfare overuse by paying special attention to the interplay between partisanship, political rhetoric and individuals' interest in politics; anti-immigrant attitudes; and gender and gender identification.
In line with existing research, our results demonstrate that beliefs about welfare overuse are highly variable between individuals within the same country (e.g., Roosma et al. 2016).We have also demonstrated that accounting for individual dispositions (and the interplay with political context)  allowed us to make accurate predictions about individuals' perceptions about welfare overuse.We argue that these findings underscore that beliefs about welfare overuse are not merely factual evaluations, but represent relatively abstract issues that are sensitive to individual dispositions and contextual clues, such as political framings.
In line with our argument about political-elite rhetoric (e.g., Zaller 1992), we find that the left-right partisan division in views about the magnitude of welfare overuse is most marked among individuals with a stronger than average political interest.Conversely, those with a lower than average political interest display no partisan differences in suspicion about welfare overuse.This finding suggests that there is a connection between political rhetoric and people's beliefs about welfare overuse.
What we did not expect to find was that the large left-right division among those with a strong interest in politics is driven only by left voters (who display markedly less suspicion the more interested in politics they are).The Swedish public debate on welfare overuse has since its inception been aligned with a distinct left-right political division, where right parties have emphasized the magnitude of the problem and underscored its connection to the system of welfare provision (Lundström 2011).Why only left voters (and greens to a lesser extent) differ internally with respect to political interest, while centre-right and right-wing populist voters do not, is something we identify as a promising avenue for future research.One tentative explanation is that this might reflect a dominant position of the centre-right (and later also of the right-wing populists) in relation to the political agenda-setting in Sweden, which would mean that being suspicious about welfare overuse is aligned with a normal state of affairs.
Regarding the sociocultural dimension, we find a strong positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion of welfare overuse.To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to make this connection empirically, although our findings are in line with previous research showing that both anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion about welfare misuse constitute key components of a single underlying dimension of cultural orientations among the populations of most European countries (Häusermann & Kriesi 2015).While previous research has found mixed results for the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and welfare state support (e.g., Ervasti et al. 2008;Goldschmidt 2017), we argue that the strong connection with suspicion of welfare overuse poses a serious risk to welfare state legitimacy amid growing anti-immigrant sentiment.
Regarding the theorized connection between suspicion of welfare overuse and the social contents of a masculine gender role stereotype, gender identification proved to be of little consequence.Men and women did not differ with respect to how strongly they identify with either gender group.We interpret this as meaning that being suspicious about welfare overuse 137 is not a particularly gendered attitude domain, and thus not more or less aligned with either a masculine or feminine gender role stereotype (cf.Diekman & Schneider 2010).
As gender has not been a particularly salient category in public discourse on welfare overuse in the Swedish context (Lundström 2011), the observation that men are more suspicious than women is difficult to understand as related to trends and patterns in political articulations.Instead, we argue that the fact that gender remained strongly associated with overuse perceptions provides support for the perspective that there are structural inequalities whereby women are more reliant on the continuance of welfare state arrangements than men are for access to labour markets and resources (e.g., O'Connor 1993; Korpi et al. 2013).
Our findings clearly point out that women cannot be viewed as less suspicious than men because they more often belong to the working class, have more frequent experiences of welfare services or are generally more trustful in their 'nature.'Instead, we argue that our findings are better understood through a lens of gender relations and policy feedback mechanisms (e.g., Mettler & Soss 2004;Svallfors 2007).The instability of women's public roles, crafted by prevailing gender norms and welfare state arrangements, creates a collectively shared experience of welfare state dependency, which in turn leads to an increased propensity to identify with the less well-off and needier groups in society (e.g., van Oorschot et al. 2017) -thereby inspiring less suspicion of welfare overuse.
In sum, our results suggest that (i) attentiveness to political articulation about welfare abuse constitutes a key intervening factor when examining partisan differences in suspicion of welfare overuse, (ii) anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly correlated with welfare overuse perceptions and (iii) that gender differences in suspicion exist above and beyond differences in self-interest variables and personal dispositions.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research
There are two main limitations to this study.First, this study relies on data collected at a single point in time.Thus, future studies aiming at gauging causality should try to model this within a longitudinal framework.Second, based on our deductive approach, we identify interesting differences in suspicion of welfare overuse related to individuals' political interest, anti-immigrant attitudes and gender.However, we believe that future qualitative work is needed to investigate the processes by which lived experiences of welfare state arrangements, gender relations and attentiveness to elite political rhetoric translate into suspicion of welfare overuse.Respondents with no information on gender, or with a non-CIS gender identity were dropped (n = 30).Cases with invalid or missing responses to age, education and region were dropped (total n = 10).Total n = 166.The achieved sample was biased towards the adult Swedish population with current or previous labour market attachment and CIS-gender identity.2. Following a pattern analysis, we treated data as missing at random (MAR).No single regression model had more than 6.43 percent missing.
. The Centre Party, Liberal Party, Moderate Party (Conservatives) and Christian Democratic Party, which together formed the governing Alliance coalition between 2006 and 2014, represent the dominant centre-right bloc in Swedish politics.Politicians as well as voters of these parties clearly place themselves at the right-hand side of the left-right spectrum, with the Christian Democrats and Moderate party farthest to the right (Gilljam et al. 2010).At the left-hand side, the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party constitute a left bloc, with the Left party farthest to the left.In addition to these traditional parties, the Green Party and the Sweden Democrats gained seats for the first time in the national parliament in 1988 and 2010, respectively.The Green Party was founded in 1981 and has been in government together with the Social Democrats since the 2014 election.The social conservative and nationalist Sweden Democrats have gained increasing support since the 2010 election and received 17.5 percent of the votes in the 2018 election.
Partisanship was operationalized by asking respondents to state which party they most sympathized with.Answers were collapsed into left (Left Party and Social Democrats), green (Green Party), centre-right (Centre Party, Liberal Party, Moderate Party/Conservatives, Christian Democratic Party), right-wing populist (Sweden Democrats) and other (other party or no party).

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Predicted Welfare Overuse Perception by Party Identification and Political Interest.
percent of variance explained).Correlations with other variables are reported in Table1.

Table 2 .
Suspicion of Welfare Overuse, Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Variable