Global sharing of COVID‐19 therapies during a “New Normal”

Abstract This paper argues for global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments during the COVID‐19 pandemic and beyond based on principles of global solidarity. It starts by distinguishing two types of COVID‐19 treatments and models sharing strategies for each in small‐group scenarios, contrasting groups that are solidaristic with those composed of self‐interest maximizers to show the appeal of solidaristic reasoning. It then extends the analysis, arguing that a similar logic should apply within and between nations. To further elaborate global solidarity, the paper distinguishes morally voluntary, sliding‐scale, and mandatory versions. It argues for an all‐hands‐on‐deck approach and gives examples to illustrate. The paper concludes that during the COVID‐19 crisis, global solidarity is a core value, and global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments should be considered a duty of justice, not of charity.

One reason for underscoring treatment as well as prevention is that even as global access to vaccines expands, many people refuse vaccines and enter the hospital with severe disease. In an ongoing global survey, Johns Hopkins University researchers reported that more than half of unvaccinated people in more than 50 countries say they definitely or probably would not get a COVID-19 vaccine. 6 In addition, the risk of COVID-19 after vaccination-so called "breakthrough cases"-has become increasingly common as new and more transmissible variants of concern have emerged. 7 Omicron is a case in point. Designated a variant of concern on November 26, 2021, most currently available vaccines provide only limited protection against the variant. 8 In addition, Omicron may be less reliably detected with commonly used COVID-19 diagnostic tests, resulting in people testing negative and unwittingly infecting others. 9 When people become infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus, the care available to them depends on many factors, including not only the supply of therapeutics, but also the supply of healthcare providers, personal protective equipment, and hospital beds, as well as transportation to access healthcare services and insurance coverage or the ability to pay for care. We focus on the supply of COVID-19 treatments, specifically treatments we call basic medicines.
These include COVID-19 treatments for which there is at least preliminary evidence showing significant reduction in severe disease and death among infected people and an ability to administer treatment on an outpatient basis or as part of a short-term hospital stay. These kinds of treatments are most amenable to sharing globally because they can more readily be used in under-resourced settings, such as low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) with little or no intensive care unit capacity and limited capacity for inpatient hospital care.
The question of global sharing arises because basic COVID-19 medicines are subject to both chronic and episodic shortages.
Chronic shortages can develop in some parts of the world as the result of intellectual property protections that give pharmaceutical companies the ability to control production and set prices that poorer countries can barely afford, thereby limiting supply. 10 The same protections enable drug companies to limit global supply by not sharing recipes and licenses for manufacturing  treatments. Episodic shortages can occur when new variants of concern render some, but not all, treatments ineffective. For example, with the Omicron coronavirus, preliminary studies showed that two of three authorized monoclonal antibodies for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis, Regeneron (casirivimab/imdevimab) and Lilly (bamlanivimab/etesevimab), lacked efficacy. 11 Only GlaxoSmithKline's Sotrovimab retained activity. 12 As of January 7, 2022, worldwide supply of Sotrovimab was extremely limited.
With few exceptions, 13 global sharing of basic COVID-19 treatments has not received the attention it deserves. Most bioethical debate about the global allocation of COVID-19 resources has addressed vaccines, 14 rather than treatments. This paper fills this gap and asks, 'Do countries have a duty to share basic COVID-19 treatments post-pandemic?' Even after the pandemic phase of COVID-19 ends, new variants of concern may emerge, and a global crisis may ensue. If  Merck's Molnupiravir, which can reduce the risk of severe disease or death in high-risk patients. It also includes monoclonal antibody therapeutics and steroids. Suboptimal therapy refers to treatments that are less beneficial than the preferred treatments and that reduce severe disease and/or death to a lesser extent. These treatments do not include modalities that are currently considered optimal-for example, Remdesivir or monoclonals would not be offered to patients who would otherwise qualify. Instead, today's suboptimal therapy might include steroid and supplemental oxygen.
With these distinctions in mind, suppose you belong to a solidaristic group (Group 1). It could be a four-person family consisting of healthy parents in their 50s and high-school children aged 16 and 17. Each member of the group has become infected by a highly transmissible mutation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Since each person was previously healthy, their risk of severe disease and death is more-or-less equal.
Suppose that preliminary clinical trial data show that 80% reduction in severe disease or death against a new coronavirus variant is provided by optimal therapy, and 60% by suboptimal treatment. Relying just on that simplified description, what would be the right thing to do if affording optimal therapy to everyone was not possible? More supply might be available later, but future allotments are uncertain. For simplicity, imagine that the group has limited resources and can invest them in one of two ways: optimal treatment for one person or suboptimal treatment for two people.
If Group 1 is inlined to be solidaristic, then when shortages like this arise, its members would offer to help one another. For example, parents might opt to give their two teenage children some protection, while foregoing protection for themselves. It might be thought that parents have a duty to sacrifice on their children's behalf, foregoing treatment for themselves unless their risk is significantly greater than their children's. If their children were younger and more dependent on their care, however, they may prefer to provide some protection to one child and one parent based on a consensus about who could best care for them. The alternative of giving one person optimal treatment and others nothing would not be considered an ethically viable option.
Yet, giving optimal protection to one member of a group and others no protection might be considered in a different solidaristic group, Group 2. Group 2 includes four people with COVID-19 who have different risk levels, with one member having a much higher chance of severe disease or death. For example, if Group 2 was a multigenerational family with two parents in their 50s, a teenager, and a 65-year-old, they may opt to give the most protection (optimal treatment) to the 65-year-old, with the other three people going without (Strategy 1). Alternatively, they may choose to give some protection (suboptimal treatment) to the 65-year-old and one of the parents in their 50s. When deciding which middle-aged adult to protect, Group 2 might seek consensus based on what was best for the group as a whole (Strategy 2). Failing consensus, they might use a random method, say flipping a coin. As shown in Table 1, the greater protection afforded the older adult would make Strategy 1 a better allocation for the group as a whole, as well as for the 65-year-old. The greater absolute risk to the child and middle-aged adults of Strategy 2 compared with Strategy 1 (0.1% and 1.0% respectively, as shown in Table 1) is small; it does not place them at great peril, even though it increases their relative risk.
The proclivity to help others in solidaristic groups reveals an allocation strategy, donation, which involves helping others by reducing one person's protection under conditions of resource scarcity. In Group 1, donation was used when parents offered to protect their children and go without. In Group 2, donation was applied when the parents and child offered to go without to protect T A B L E 1 Hypothetical risk for severe disease or death with different allocation strategies the older adult who faced relatively higher risk, and when one parent and one child offered to go without to protect a larger number of people (two people rather than one person).
Notice that a decision to donate to give more protection to others could be reached by appealing to utilitarian reasoning.
However, a key difference between utility maximizers and solidaristic deliberators is that utility maximizers are unconcerned with how benefits get distributed; they focus just on maximizing aggregate good. For this reason, utility maximizers would help those facing serious threats to their health and life only if doing so maximized aggregate benefits. By contrast, solidaristic deliberators show concern not only for the collective "we" but for individuals as such, making reasonable efforts to distribute limited resources in ways that help those in greatest peril reach a minimal threshold of protection.
To further elaborate solidaristic reasoning, consider a scenario in which only suboptimal protection is available, and the supply is only enough for three people. Group 1 (where all members have roughly equal risk) might allot each of the two children protection and, for the remaining treatment, seek consensus; failing consensus, they might draw straws, reflecting an underlying belief that each person is valued equally. Group 2 (where risks are not equal) might divvy up their three treatments to give priority to those at greatest risk, which would be the older adult and two middle-aged parents.
We might juxtapose these solidaristic groups with a different kind of group, Group 3, which is not solidaristic, but instead is composed of self-interested maximizers. In Group 3, there exists little mutual concern among members. When COVID-19 treatments are limited, conflicts are apt to arise about which eligible person should receive priority, with each vying to put their individual interests ahead of others. In this group, each member presses for the highest protection possible (optimal treatment), rejecting lesser protection, irrespective of their risk relative to others in the group. During an infectious disease outbreak, "solidarity" applies in the most basic sense of the word: individuals are "united or at one in some respect, especially in interests, sympathies, or aspiration." 17 Solidarity in this sense is not derived from essential features of humanity, but from concrete recognitions of similarities in a specific context. 18 In the context of a pandemic, all share susceptibility to disease and death from a contagious pathogen. Prainsack and Buyx characterize solidarity as also including a response, which takes the form of "an enacted commitment to carry 'costs' (financial, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others with whom a person or persons recognize a similarity in a relevant respect." 19 A group of people enact solidarity during a pandemic when they are willing to expose themselves to risk to assist others with whom they share a common vulnerability.

| SOLIDARITY WITHIN AND BETWEEN NATIONS
Building on these ideas, we propose that a commitment to The spread of the Delta variant of concern serves to illustrate. After the initial detection of Delta in India, it rapidly spread across the world, creating resurgences of COVID-19 wherever it landed, and spreading at a rate consistent with its being roughly 60% more transmissible than the already highly infectious Alpha variant. 27 In the context of the Delta variant, dichotomies between "us" and "them" T A B L E 2 Solidarity and self-interested maximizing strategies (1) Self-interested maximizing: priority to one's own citizens (2) Solidarity: priority to people at greatest risk wherever they are (1) and (2)  Finally, it might be argued that enlightened self-interest maximizers in wealthy nations would reach the same conclusion as solidaristic reasoners did in our example (shown in Table 2). They would consider their long-term self-interest and wish to avoid dangerous mutations that could arise by not treating high-risk people. 38 In reply, political winds often steer self-interested maximizers to focus on shorter-term goals. This is because political leaders who reason in accordance with self-interested maximizing apply this reasoning to their own case. In

| Voluntary solidarity
One option is what Gunson calls "weak solidarity," 40  Charity-like approaches can also spawn dependence among recipients, weakening, rather than strengthening, their capacities for future agency. By contrast, solidarity encourages people to stand together and be mutually responsible for helping one another.

| Sliding-scale solidarity
A second possibility identifies duties toward compatriots and people beyond borders and seeks to balance them, usually in a way that leans heavily toward compatriots. This view is suggested by moderate nationalists, such as Scheffler, who recognize duties to people everywhere, yet consider duties to fellow citizens stronger. 42 According to sliding-scale solidarity, once basic COVID-19 treatment for people at high risk is reached within a nation, that nation has a duty of charity to donate a percentage of its supply of basic COVID-19 treatments to other nations with high-risk groups that lack such protection. This could be coordinated by an international organization overseeing procurement and distribution.
Additional supplies can be used for compatriots with lesser needs. When global sharing of COVID-19 therapies is seen as a duty of justice, it is morally mandatory, enforceable, and applies impartially. 47 Unlike charity, solidarity as justice springs from recognition of similarities, rather than of differences. 48  or mandatory-will require more cooperation than the world has so far witnessed.

| CONCLUSION
In conclusion, during the COVID-19 pandemic, people who become infected with the novel coronavirus require treatment to reduce their risk of severe disease and death. As new treatments become available, both chronic and episodic global shortages of treatments may occur, raising questions about their just allocation.
We have argued that solidarity ought to guide the allocation of globally scarce COVID-19 treatments. During a pandemic and beyond, showing solidarity is a duty of justice, not charity.
Emphasizing solidarity during a crisis builds social capital necessary for long-term recovery after the crisis subsides. The "new normal"