These observations suggest that greater theorizing is needed around the domestic politics of renegotiation strategy choice.

As long as powerful clubs of common interest proliferate, rising powers will likely find it difficult to gain systematic and structural – as opposed to ad hoc – leverage over global governance.

IIGOs provide a propitious setting for states to adapt institutional arrangements to the evolving power distribution. Both challengers to and beneficiaries of the prevailing institutional distribution of power benefit from IIGOs during times of power shifts to avoid major institutional disruptions that would damage them all.

When it comes to negotiations over international order, club institutions and the politics of gaining entry have important roles to play.

As coalitions shift, and as the urgency and uneven impacts of climate change inexorably reveal themselves, there will be new demands for ambitious action accompanied by new debates over differentiation in climate institutions.

China’s participation in the international order has increased its ability to challenge the status quo. It is precisely because China became increasingly embedded in institutional resources over time that it has proven capable of legitimating demands for reform: the resources of the WTO, IMF, and UNSC not only constrain, but enable, China’s ambitions. China’s membership in institutions inside the liberal order has given that state increasing authority to pursue far-reaching challenges through rhetorical challenges.

Soft-power based negotiation strategies are most effective when the states using them can mobilize broad, integrated coalitions to support their positions and their targets are relatively isolated.